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Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech: 
An Argument for an Amended Model Rule 8.4 
By Jefferey Ogden Katz & Alexander I. Passo 
ABSTRACT 
Since the invention of the internet, our lives have changed dramatically. 
Conveying ideas and information to broad audiences has become much 
simpler, as all types of ideas are now shared—including hateful ones 
targeted at minority groups. 
The internet is a bastion for hate speech within the United States. There 
are countless discriminatory posts circulated online daily, often by those 
who are meant to protect us. Unfortunately, attorneys frequently take part 
in this. National headlines have been made due to attorneys’ and judges’ 
controversial online posts, frequently targeting minorities. This has become 
a problem, as public perception of these professions is undermined when 
this occurs. Attorneys as administrators of justice should not make public 
discriminatory statements, as our legal system must be color blind. When 
officers of the court make discriminatory statements, this conduct runs afoul 
of what our legal system is working to create—a United States where all its 
citizens feel equally protected by the law as granted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
This article first analyzes the First Amendment and hate speech. It then 
provides a summary of how attorneys’ First Amendment rights have been 
constitutionally restricted in comparison to the general public. In 
conclusion, this article argues that a new Model Rule should be adopted by 
the American Bar Association (ABA) that prohibits attorneys from posting 
hate speech and suggests several possible formulations for this rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the internet and its prolific use has had a tremendous 
impact on the world. Work has become more efficient, information has 
become more accessible, and people gather remotely to exchange ideas. All 
of this is attributable in some part to the copious use of the internet in the 
modern world. 
One obvious feature of the internet is the ability to communicate with 
others. Forums, blogs, message boards, and chat rooms are now part of 
internet users’ daily lives. The ability to communicate via these online 
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features enables users to express themselves, provide opinions, and interact 
in cyber communities. 
There are apparent positive aspects because the internet enables people to 
instantaneously connect with others. For example, individuals who may be 
suffering from depression can seek help in a community that empathizes 
with and guides them to seek help. An academic can collaborate with a 
colleague a thousand miles away on a project instantaneously. Or, citizens 
of a country can come together and have a large-scale town hall debate on 
important political issues. 
In these circumstances, with the good comes the bad. Communication, 
which perhaps is the cornerstone of the internet, is akin to speech. With 
speech, there is always the possibility an individual may use it to 
discriminate, harass, intimidate, or otherwise use it in an abusive manner 
towards others. Thus, while the internet facilitates increased 
communication, it may also facilitate increased discrimination, harassment, 
and other abuse. 
There has been a great deal of debate over how to remedy this problem 
because unregulated internet speech has had damaging results on 
individuals’ lives. National headlines have been created because of the ease 
with which negative pictures and thoughts can be conveyed instantly to a 
large-scale audience. However, regulating speech on the internet in the 
United States is not a simple task because free speech is a fundamental right 
indoctrinated in the US Constitution in its very First Amendment. 
This article will analyze whether legal professionals can be disciplined 
for making discriminatory and misogynistic remarks online, or whether 
disciplining an attorney for this conduct would run afoul of the First 
Amendment. The first section of this article will provide some examples of 
attorney conduct online that should trigger discipline. The second section 
will provide a background of the First Amendment, protected versus 
unprotected speech, and when protected speech may still be regulated. The 
third section will explain why the United States has a growing hate speech 
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problem online due to its First Amendment protections and will argue that 
attorneys should not be permitted to contribute to this problem. 
The fourth section of the article will lay out examples of when attorneys’ 
First Amendment rights have been held to be permissibly regulated, as well 
as a history of a prior proposal to modify the ABA Model Rules to prohibit 
attorneys from engaging in discriminatory conduct. The final section of the 
article will provide several options for language to be adopted in the Model 
Rules to prohibit this conduct and will conclude by selecting and explaining 
the best option. 
II. ONLINE LEGAL COMMUNITIES AND FORUMS 
Attorneys use the internet. There are countless blogs, websites, listservs, 
and forums that attorneys participate in frequently. And, the percentage of 
attorneys who use the internet socially continues to grow. In 2010, the 
ABA’s Legal Technology Survey indicated that 56 percent of attorneys 
responding to it participated in an online community or social network.1 
According to the 2013 survey, 81 percent of responding lawyers indicated 
they use social networks.2 In all likelihood, this percentage will continue to 
grow as time progresses. 
Unfortunately, there have been numerous occasions where attorneys and 
even judges have utilized these online outlets with the intent to specifically 
harm one another, make unprofessional remarks, and engage in 
discriminatory and sexist statements. 3  Most likely, this is because the 
internet provides the illusion that they have made these statements 
anonymously. These individuals would assuredly not publish these 
comments with their names attached. But, with the impression of 
                                                        
1 J. Randolph Evans & Shari Klevens, Law, Ethics and the Internet: Applying Ethical 
Rules to Social Media is, of Necessity, Already Underway, DAILY REPORT (Aug. 13, 
2013). 
2 Id. 
3 See infra notes 8, 15, 23, and 29. 
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anonymity, disparaging remarks are freely let loose without much 
forethought by users.4 
Numerous examples exist of these types of situations occurring within 
the legal community. For instance, AutoAdmit.com holds itself out as “the 
most prestigious” law forum on the internet, but racist and misogynistic 
statements are germane in its threads.5 Allegedly, the website’s primary 
purpose is to disseminate information about law schools and law firms.6 
However, law professor Brian Leiter once remarked on his blog that 
AutoAdmit in fact is just “a massive forum for bizarre racist, anti-Semitic, 
and viciously sexist postings, mixed in with posts genuinely related to law 
school.”7 
The website gained notoriety when a defamation lawsuit was filed 
against 28 “John Does” who used the website and made statements about 
two separate females.8 Brittan Heller, a Yale Law School student at the 
time, and Heide Iravani, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate from the University of 
North Carolina, initiated this lawsuit against the anonymous AutoAdmit 
                                                        
4 See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBER-PSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 
321, 321–26 (2004). 
5 See The Most Prestigious Law School Discussion Board in the World, AUTOADMIT, 
http://www.autoadmit.com (“The most prestigious law school discussion board in the 
world”) (last visited Aug. 9, 2014); see also, LORI ANDREWS, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND 
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY: I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID 103 
(2011) (The term “AutoAdmit” is derived from a law school applicants’ high metrics 
consisting of LSAT and GPA, which thereby guarantees that they will be admitted to a 
top law school). 
6 Id. 
7 Brian Leiter, Penn Law Student, Anthony Ciolli, Admits to Running Prelaw Discussion 
Board Awash in Racist, Anti-Semitic, Sexist Abuse, LEITER REPORTS (Mar. 11, 2005),  
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/03/penn_law_studen.html. 
8 ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 103 (noting AutoAdmit had an inordinate amount of 
threads with racist and sexist words within them: “In 2005, only 150 threads discussed 
UCLA, just over 100 were about ‘clerkships,’ and around 100 were about ‘Georgetown.’ 
In contrast AutoAdmit contained about 250 threads with the word ‘nigger,’ 300 threads 
with the word ‘bitches,’ almost 300 threads with the word ‘cunt,’ 350 threads about Jews 
(the majority derogatory), and over 200 threads about ‘fags[.]’”). 
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users due to numerous disturbing derogatory messages posted on the 
website pertaining to them specifically.9 
For instance, when referring to Ms. Heller, one user posted, “I’ll force 
myself on [Ms. Heller], most definitely,” and “I think I will sodomize her. 
Repeatedly.”10 Another user stated that she had herpes.11 In regards to Ms. 
Iravani, the AutoAdmit posters repeatedly made comments stating that she 
was impregnated after her father raped her.12 And, another user created a 
moniker of the University of North Carolina law school dean at the time and 
posted that Ms. Iravani had sex with him for a passing grade in her Civil 
Procedure class.13 
While it cannot be proven these individuals were licensed attorneys, in all 
likelihood, attorneys do engage in similar conduct on AutoAdmit. One of 
the administrators of the website once disclosed that the posters in a single 
thread were cumulatively linked to “virtually every firm in the Vault Top 
50”—which are arguably considered the most prestigious law firms in the 
United States. 14  Consequently, it is very likely that many attorneys do 
indeed participate on this forum. 
Recently, another public debate emerged on whether attorneys should 
face state bar sanctions as a result of pseudo-anonymous racist comments.15 
One poster using the moniker “dybbuk” made several sexist and harassing 
comments about a University of Denver law professor named Nancy 
                                                        
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 102. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 103. 
13 Id. 
14 Posting of Great Teacher Onizuka (Nov. 29, 2006, 6:30 PM), http://www.xoxohth. 
com/thread.php?thread_id=535893&mc=164&forum_id=2#7096421 (“Speaking of IPs, 
it seems like virtually every firm in the Vault Top 50 is represented in the IP logs for this 
thread right now”). 
15 Debra Cassens Weiss, Blogging law prof requests ethics probe of ‘dybbuk’ 
commenter, ABA JOURNAL, (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/blogging_law_prof_files_ethics_complaint_against_pd_after_concluding_he
_was/. 
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Leong.16 Ms. Leong identified at least seventy times “dybbuk” posted about 
her on five different websites.17 As part of these comments, “dybbuk” wrote 
two long plays that included Ms. Leong using drugs and made overly sexual 
remarks about her.18 Ms. Leong was able to identify who ‘dybbuk’ was by 
reading his previous posts that included enough information when linked 
together to uncover his identity.19 Allegedly this individual is a male federal 
public defender in Illinois. 20  After unmasking ‘dybbuk,’ Ms. Leong 
subsequently filed an ethical complaint with the Illinois Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) as a result of his 
postings.21 In her complaint to the Illinois ARDC, she stated that “dybbuk’s 
‘sexualized comments about [her] appearance and other disparaging 
remarks made [her] concerned for [her] safety.’”22 
In another extreme example, Paul Caston, a Mississippi lawyer, was 
linked with the anonymous online identity “GENERAL_LEE” on the Anti-
Semitic Vanguard News Network website.23 Mr. Caston has posted on this 
website over 3,500 times over the course of a decade.24  While on this 
website, he opined on his beliefs that African-Americans were objects, 
animals, or things.25 
Attorneys are not the only individuals in the legal community who have 
been placed in the crosshairs as a result of their anonymous postings on 
forums—judges too have drawn national attention for their internet 
                                                        
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Ryan Lenz, Hatewatch Investigation: Mississippi Lawyer Tied to Online Racist 
Screeds, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sept. 20, 2013, 8:15 AM),  http://www.spl 
center.org/blog/2013/09/20/hatewatch-investigation-mississippi-lawyer-tied-to-online-
racist-screeds/. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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comments. But, judges, unlike attorneys, are provided less free speech 
protection as a result of swearing to abide by the Code of Judicial Ethics.26 
For instance, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.1 broadly 
prohibits judges from engaging in extrajudicial activities that “would appear 
to a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or 
impartiality.”27 Further, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.6 
prohibits judges from any affiliation with organizations that practice 
invidious discrimination.28 
On March 3, 2014, an Arkansas Circuit Court judge withdrew from a 
race for a seat on the Arkansas Court of Appeals as a result of his sexist and 
discriminatory forum comments being unmasked.29 Judge Mike Maggio for 
several years posted on tigerdroppings.com, a Louisiana State University  
sports fan website, under the name of “beauxjudge.”30 While on the website, 
he openly disclosed, via postings, that he was indeed a judge.31 
A portion of Judge Maggio’s comments on the website were sexist. For 
example, Judge Maggio posted, “[w]omen look at 2 bulges on a man, one in 
the front of the pants or second one in the back pocket. Whichever one is 
bigger they can do without the other.”32 In another post, Judge Maggio 
made remarks about Charlize Theron’s adoption of an African American 
baby that could be perceived as racist. 33  On yet another occasion, he 
commented that you don’t see many doctors with names that appear to be 
associated with African Americans.34 After his identity was revealed, Judge 
                                                        
26 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3B(5) (2013) (prohibiting a judge 
from bias or prejudice predicated upon discrimination). 
27 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012). 
28 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2012). 
29 Joe Patrice, Judge Caught Making Racist, Sexist Comments On Internet Board, 
ABOVE THE LAW (March 4, 2014, 11:47 AM),  http://abovethelaw.com/2014/03/judge-
caught-making-racist-sexist-comments-on-Internet-board/. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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Maggio attempted to prevent further discovery of his comments and began 
deleting them from the website.35 The Judicial Discipline and Disability 
Board acknowledged that it was investigating whether Judge Maggio indeed 
was the poster of these comments, and whether he was in violation of any 
ethical rules.36 
This type of conduct by actors in the legal community draws up the 
question of whether it should be permissible. The potential negative impacts 
of this speech by these individuals substantially outweigh the positives.  
However, as the next section of this Article will explain in detail, the First 
Amendment protects discriminatory and misogynistic speech, and therefore 
it is difficult to regulate this conduct in most circumstances. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
One may wonder why there are not more measures in place to prevent  
discriminatory and misogynistic speech. However, it is important to 
understand that the First Amendment provides citizens the fundamental 
right of free speech. Under the First Amendment, before hate speech can be 
restricted, a two-step analysis must be conducted. First, a court must 
determine whether hate speech falls within a category of speech the 
Supreme Court has deemed unprotected. Second, if hate speech does not 
fall within such a category, then there must be consideration of whether hate 
speech can be regulated pursuant to the standard free speech analysis. 
The First Amendment is one of the most well-known and discussed 
fundamental constitutional rights, and it provides US citizens the freedom 
of speech. Specifically, the First Amendment states that 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
                                                        
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.37 
Because of the First Amendment, individuals are able to freely practice 
their religion, participate in groups, criticize the government in distributed 
publications, and speak publicly or anonymously.38 
One of the principle reasons the First Amendment was incorporated in 
the Bill of Rights was the governmental suppression of speech and press 
that existed in English society.39 While the constitutional framers’ intent 
when drafting this fundamental right has been bogged down in modernity 
from a quagmire of theories, ironically, one argument for the protection is 
to promote tolerance.40 Underlying this argument is the ideology that ideas 
and theories should not be stifled by the government simply because they 
are not backed by the majority of a nation. 
This theory is reflected in the Supreme Court’s current test for 
determining whether the government is suppressing speech. In Abrams v. 
United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned a famous dissent 
arguing that the First Amendment should foster a country with a “free trade 
in ideas[.]”41 While this principle was first uttered in Holmes’s dissent, it 
has been adopted as a credible rationale in subsequent First Amendment 
precedent. The Supreme Court has often held that the government cannot 
regulate speech based simply upon content, or when a particular view point 
is silenced.42 
                                                        
37 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
38 The Supreme Court’s position on public criticism of the government has vacillated 
throughout the years. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (holding that a ban 
on anonymous handbills was unconstitutional). 
39 See generally, ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1941). 
40 See generally, LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
42 See Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content”); see also, R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech 75 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
In a 1992 Supreme Court decision, Justice Kennedy explicitly explained, 
[g]overnment action that stifles speech on account of its message, 
or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the 
Government, contravenes this essential right . . . . For these 
reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-
understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control 
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.43 
Accordingly, when courts review a governmentally content-based or view-
point-based regulation, they must apply the strict scrutiny test.44 In order for 
a content-based or view-point-based discriminatory regulation to be 
constitutional, the government must show that the regulation (1) furthers a 
compelling state interest, and (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that end.45  The strict scrutiny test is a very difficult burden for the 
government to satisfy and generally when it is triggered the regulation will 
be struck down as unconstitutional. 
While the plain language of the First Amendment appears in nature to be 
absolute, the Supreme Court has never supported an absolutist position. The 
Court has expressly “reject[ed] the view that freedom of speech and 
association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 
‘absolutes.’”46 In fact, virtually only one Justice has ever taken the position 
                                                                                                                     
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 382 (1992) (“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively 
invalid”). 
43 Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F. Communication Comm., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
44 See, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988). 
45 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For 
the State to enforce content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end”). 
46 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). 
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the First Amendment is absolute.47 Not surprisingly, it was Justice Black—
an absolutist.48 
Furthermore, the Court has never departed from its reasoning that speech 
uttered for the purpose of criminal conduct or to incite immediate violence 
and chaos is not protected by the First Amendment.49 In Brandenberg v. 
Ohio, the Court defined when the government could punish speech made 
with the purpose of inciting illegal behavior.50 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux 
Klan leader was convicted because of an Ohio law prohibiting criminal 
syndicalism.51 This leader was arrested for incitement of violence due to a 
film of him at a Ku Klux Klan rally—which included his racist and anti-
Semitic speech along with a display of a number of firearms. 52  This 
landmark Supreme Court opinion, which overruled several other prior 
opinions, created a stringent test for incitement.53 For speech that incites 
illegal behavior to be unprotected, three elements must be found: (1) an 
imminent harm; (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action; and (3) an 
intent to cause imminent illegality.54 
                                                        
47 See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. 865, 874, 879 (1960) (“The phrase 
‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily understood. . . . The 
language is absolute[.]”); see also, Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56 (Black dissenting joined 
by Douglass) (here Justice Douglass also adopted the absolutist position). 
48 Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56. 
49 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445–49 (1969). See also W. Bradley Wendel, 
Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 305 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380) 
(conceding that burning cross in back yard of African-American family can be prosecuted 
as a terroristic threat or damage to property); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07 
(1989) (suggesting that flag burning could be prosecuted under a statute prohibiting 
outdoor fires); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“First 
Amendment does not preclude regulation of commercial conduct”); Brandenburg, 395 
U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“‘The Line between what is permissible and not 
subject to control and what may be made subject to regulation is the line between ideas 
and overt acts’”). 
50 See Brandenburg, 385 U.S. at 457–58. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech 77 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
Additionally, the First Amendment offers no protection for speech that 
constitutes a “‘true’ threat.”55 Brandenberg is intrinsically related to the true 
threat test, as it involves speech promoting violence. In 2003, the Supreme 
Court in Virginia v. Black explained what constitutes a true threat.56 Justice 
O’Connor stated in her plurality opinion that true threats are  
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals . . . [the 
speaker] need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of 
violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to 
protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will occur.57 
Further, she indicated intimidation is “a type of true threat, where a speaker 
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the 
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”58 
Another type of unprotected speech is “fighting words.”59 The Supreme 
Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire expressly held that speech that 
constitutes “fighting words” was unprotected by the First Amendment.60 In 
Chaplinsky, the Court recognized two separate instances where speech 
could be considered “fighting words”: (1) when the speech was likely to 
cause a violent response against the speaker, and (2) when the insulting 
speech would likely inflict immediate emotional harm. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does 
not protect people from common law tort actions as a result of their speech. 
                                                        
55 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); see also Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (holding that threats to individuals are not 
protected under the First Amendment, but speech that may cause distress or be 
disagreeable to individuals is protected). 
56 See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
57 Id. at 359–60 (internal citations omitted). 
58 Id. at 360. 
59 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
60 Id. 
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For instance, the First Amendment does not protect an individual from 
liability if they make defamatory remarks about another person.61 However, 
the statements made must be false and non-opinionated, and must not fall 
within one of the First Amendment exceptions—for example, certain 
statements about a public figure.62 
A.  Hate Speech and the First Amendment 
Defining hate speech is a difficult task. Perhaps the simplest definition of 
hate speech is discriminatory and derogatory statements or symbolic actions 
that target a specific group. Examples of hate speech are: racial slurs, 
overtly sexist comments, and physical actions such as burning crosses in the 
front yards of African Americans or spray-painting swastikas on a Jewish 
family’s residences. 
Currently, hate speech is protected under the First amendment.63 In order 
for hate speech to be unprotected, it must fall within one of the First 
Amendment exceptions. Traditionally, the most successful arguments that 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment are the “true threat” 
doctrine, or the Chaplinsky “fighting words” exception in regulating speech 
that may be considered “hate speech.”64 
There has been scholarly debate over whether hate speech should be 
considered protected speech under the First Amendment.65 Perhaps the most 
compelling argument for the permissibility of regulating racist and sexist 
speech is that hate speech should be considered akin to unprotected conduct 
                                                        
61 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
62 Id. 
63 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 116 (1966); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
64 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 116 (1966); see also, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 
(1942) (Fighting words are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”). 
65 See generally, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); David Kretzmer, Freedom of 
Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
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(i.e., tort action) in that it conflicts with the constitutional value of 
equality.66 However, this type of argument has yet to make any traction 
within the court system. 
Public college campuses, bastions for diverse and divergent thoughts, are 
participants in this debate because they construct codes prohibiting hate 
speech. 67  In the past, when these codes are challenged for their 
constitutionality, the colleges and universities argue the codes are 
constitutional because they are within the “fighting words” constitutional 
exception category. 68  But, this more than likely has changed after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul.69 In that case, the 
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the City’s speech 
ordinance was constitutional under the “fighting words” exception.70 The 
ordinance criminalized the  
plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol . . . including but 
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows 
or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others 
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.71 
Ultimately, in R.A.V., the Supreme Court determined that the ordinance 
was narrowed only to prevent fighting words in limited circumstances (the 
protection of targeted minority groups) and therefore it was 
unconstitutional.72 Notably, in its opinion the Court stated that the City of 
Saint Paul could prohibit cross burning if the statute was drafted in a 
manner consistent with the First Amendment.73 This would entail drafting a 
                                                        
66 See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 180 (1982). 
67 See generally Lawrence, supra note 65. 
68 Id. 
69 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 380. 
72 Id. at 394. 
73 Id. at 396 (“St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior 
without adding the First Amendment to the fire”). 
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statute that prohibits this conduct generally, as opposed to isolating and 
protecting only minority groups. 
As aforementioned in the previous sections in this article, attorneys make 
statements on the internet that are categorized as hate speech. While hate 
speech is generally permissible pursuant to First Amendment protection, a 
question arises as to whether speech should be permissible if it is harmful.  
The next section of this article explains what problems arise from hate 
speech on the internet and why hate speech is particularly harmful to 
professional groups, such as attorneys. 
IV.  PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF EXISTING 
INTERNET HATE SPEECH LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In contrast to many other countries, the United States provides hate 
speech a constitutional protection.74 After World War II, many European 
countries passed laws and signed international agreements prohibiting hate 
speech.75 For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination explicitly provides in Article 4 that 
parties  
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such 
acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or 
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist 
activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal 
and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such 
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) 
                                                        
74 See Louis Henkin, Group Defamation and International Law, in GROUP DEFAMATION 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 123 (Monroe Freedman & Eric Freedman, eds., 1995). 
75 Christopher Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the 
Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE 781, 785–86 (2005). 
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Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or 
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.76 
Over 150 nations signed the Convention, including the majority of the 
members of the Council of Europe.77 Interestingly, the United States also 
ratified the Convention; however, it did so with the reservation that it would 
refuse to undertake any measures that would violate its First Amendment.78 
Hate speech falls within the category of protected speech of the First 
Amendment. 79  Laws cannot be promulgated restricting it if they are 
restricting one view point as opposed to another.80 Furthermore, anonymous 
speech over the internet is also provided the highest degree of First 
Amendment protection.81 Because of the United States’ current protection 
of internet hate speech, hate speech dedicated websites and forums run 
rampant online. The Southern Poverty Law Center in 1998 determined that 
163 hate sites existed on the internet.82 In 2005, this number exploded to 
524.83 These numbers are only indicative of websites that are dedicated to 
discrimination. It does not take into account individual discriminatory 
comments that are as freely posted as blog comments or forum postings. 
This has simply become a problem. Individuals are harmed as a result of 
hate speech online. And, it is even arguably chilling another individual’s 
                                                        
76 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966). 
77 See Blarcum, supra note 75, at 786. 
78 Id. 
79 See supra note 64. 
80 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 45. 
81 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
82 Number of Hate Sites Increase Online: Hate groups find a home on the Net, 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (1998), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/1998/winter/163-and-counting (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2014). 
83 Mark Potok, Hate Groups Increase Numbers, Unite Against Immigrants, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY LAW CENTER (2006), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2006/spring/the-year-in-hate-2005 (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
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speech if specifically directed at a targeted individual.84 For example, in 
2007, a former Technorati Top 100 blog on the subject of how to design 
user-friendly software was shut down as a result of repeated cyber 
harassment directed at the creator.85 Kathy Sierra, the blogger who hosted 
this site, continuously received threats and explicit sexual posts directed 
towards her on the site, which inevitably led her to fear for her safety and 
negatively affected her mental health.86 At one point, Ms. Sierra was even 
afraid of going into her backyard.87 Commenters demeaned her by posting 
her photograph next to a noose and, doctoring a photo to show her face 
muzzling red lace panties.88 Moreover, one commenter actually posted her 
home address and social security number.89 
Should this be allowed to occur? Current First Amendment legal 
precedent generally permits cyber-harassment of this sort.90 This should 
change. But, in the meantime, in circumstances similar to “dybbuk” and 
Professor Leong, when an attorney is the commenter, can state bar 
associations prohibit this conduct? In examining this question, it is 
important to consider two questions: (1) whether an individual who engages 
in this conduct is fit to practice law; and (2) whether this conduct is 
detrimental to the image of the profession. 
                                                        
84 ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 102. 
85 Id. (citing Alex Pham, Cyber-bullies’ Abuse, Threats Hurl Fear into the Blogosphere, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES, March 31, 2007, at C1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/31/business/fi-Internet31). 
86 Id. (citing Pham, supra note 85). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (citing Dylan Tweney, Kathy Sierra Case: Few Clues, Little Evidence, Much 
Controversy, WIRED (April 16, 2007), available at 
www.wired.com/techbiz/people/news/2007/04/kathysierra); Cathy Seipp & Kathy Sierra, 
Wild in the Blog-o-shphere,” FISHBOWL LA BLOG (March 27, 2007), 
www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlla/cathy-seipp-and-kathy-sierra-wild-in-the-blog-o-
sphere_b3903. 
90 There has been considerable debate in several states and Congress in adopting statutes 
which will criminalize certain conduct which can be defined as cyber-harassment. 
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V. ATTORNEYS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
As any other citizen of the United States, an attorney is provided the 
same rights under the Constitution—including the First Amendment. 
Therefore, attorneys’ speech is protected and cannot be restricted unless 
certain conditions apply. Regulating attorneys’ discriminatory or harassing 
remarks online, or elsewhere, similar to remarks by other citizens, is 
difficult under the existing First Amendment precedent. But, attorneys’ 
speech has been limited, despite their First Amendment rights, in manners 
that differ from limitations on speech by the general public in some 
circumstances. For instance, attorneys can be sanctioned for making 
disparaging remarks about the judiciary and have additional restrictions 
imposed on them for commercial speech. 91  Thus, a proposed measure 
restricting attorneys from engaging in hate speech, regardless of the First 
Amendment, may still be constitutional. 
A.  Limitations on Attorneys’ Free Speech 
The nature of attorneys’ profession requires more restrictions on their 
speech in contrast to the general public. Ethical rules adopted by states that 
otherwise would be considered unconstitutional are still upheld as 
constitutional in the context of attorneys if they “are justified by a state’s 
interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary and ensuring fair 
and impartial adjudications.”92 Justice Cardozo acknowledged this principle 
in In re Rouss, by stating that membership to the bar is a privilege burdened 
with conditions. 93  In that case, an attorney elected to use his Fifth 
Amendment right by refusing to testify on an issue that would be self-
                                                        
91 See infra notes 96, 99, & 103. 
92 Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 
161, 169 (2008). 
93 In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917). 
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incriminating, and later was disciplined for asserting this constitutional right 
by his state bar.94 
In re Rouss is just one example of courts recognizing that an attorney can 
be disciplined by their respective state bar association for otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech. 95  State bar associations follow this 
principal when limiting attorneys’ otherwise fundamental rights in 
circumstances where a compelling interest exists to maintain the integrity of 
the profession. The following subsections of this article provide explicit 
rules and examples of restrictions on attorneys’ First Amendment rights. 
1.  Speech Critical of the Judiciary—Model Rule 8.2 
The ABA adopted a model rule prohibiting attorneys from making false 
statements and negative comments against the judiciary.96 
Pursuant to Model Rule 8.2, 
(a) [a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to 
be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory 
officer or public legal officer, or a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial or legal office. 
Comment 1 of Model Rule 8.2 provides that an attorney may not speak or 
act in a manner that will “unfairly undermine public confidence in the 
administration of justice.”97 In fact, many states will even sanction attorneys 
for statements pertaining to judges that constitute mere opinion—i.e., 
attorneys’ opinions about the intelligence of a judge or a judge’s character.98 
                                                        
94 Id. 
95 Id. (Holding that the New York State Bar Association’s disbarment of an attorney who 
did not provide testimony against himself was permissible). 
96 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2 (2013). 
97 Id. 
98 See Margaret C. Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney 
Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569 (2009); see contra, Standing 
Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an attorney 
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Furthermore, the forum in which the statement was made is irrelevant in 
determining whether an attorney has violated the rule.99 
Rule 8.2 extends to statements that have been made orally in private 
conversation or in public.100 Logically, the rule has been extended to the 
virtual world to cases in which attorneys criticize judges on the internet. For 
instance, a Florida attorney was disciplined after describing a judge on her 
blog as an “‘evil, unfair witch’ with an ‘ugly condescending attitude.’”101 
As a result of this comment, the Florida Bar reprimanded the attorney and 
required her to pay $1,250.102 
One of the principle reasons that the ABA adopted Rule 8.2 was to 
protect the public’s perception of judicial integrity from being impugned.103 
In a United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opinion, Chief 
Judge Easterbrook held that attorneys simply do not receive the same First 
Amendment rights in regard to political debate as ordinary citizens.104 With 
this stance, the Seventh Circuit upheld the disbarment of an attorney in 
federal courts due to his statements about judges’ character.105  The attorney 
in this case was disbarred by the State of Illinois for making baseless 
accusations that judges had committed criminal acts and other wrongs.106 
However, there have been many criticisms of this rationale because the 
judiciary essentially has entrenched itself from intra-professional criticism; 
even in instances of potential judicial abuse, attorneys are restrained from 
making public comments. 107  Irrespective of these criticisms, it is well 
                                                                                                                     
can only be punished for critical speech against the judiciary if it is shown that the speech 
was made with actual malice). 
99 See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1621. 
100 Id. at 1569–70. 
101 Tresa Baldas, Lawyers Critical of Judges Fight For Rights, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202428070373. 
102 Id. 
103 See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1570. 
104 In re Michael Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1601–02, 1609. 
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established currently that attorneys can be prohibited by their state bar 
associations from making negative comments against the judiciary.108 
2.  Advertising and Solicitation 
Commercial speech has long been recognized as falling within the 
category of protected speech.109 Advertising and soliciting individuals to 
use one’s services or product therefore are considered protected speech. 
States have attempted to curtail attorneys’ advertising and solicitation of 
new clients by promulgating state bar rules prohibiting certain types of 
conduct.110 However, the Supreme Court has routinely held that attorneys 
cannot be prohibited from engaging in truthful, non-deceptive advertising of 
their services.111 
In contrast, the Court has held that state ethical rules prohibiting 
attorneys from in-person solicitation of clients for profit are acceptable.112 
The Court held that the distinction between the two is that states possess a 
“compelling interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve 
fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 
vexatious conduct.” 113  It reasoned that in-person solicitation has the 
inherent risk that an attorney will deceive and pressure a potential client, as 
there is no way to monitor the attorney’s communication with that client.114 
                                                        
108 Id. at 1569–70, 1574. 
109 See generally Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from 
advertising price of drugs unconstitutional). However, it should be noted that commercial 
speech is provided a lesser degree of protection. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”). 
110 See generally Kyle Perkins, Advertising: The Marketing of Legal Services in the 
Twenty-First Century, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 99 (2000); Mitchel Winick, et. al, Attorney 
Advertising on the Internet: From Arizona to Texas-Regulating Speech on the Cyber-
Frontier, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1489 (1996). 
111 See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
112 See generally Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447. 
113 Id. at 462. 
114 Id. at 465. 
Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech 87 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
These model rules have been applied to attorneys’ speech online as 
well. 115  Internet communications are analogous to telephone 
communications and in-person conversations due to the conveyance of 
instantaneous messages. Consequently, some state bar associations have 
prohibited attorneys from communicating with individuals by these means 
under solicitation rules.116 
3. Administration of Justice—Model Rules 3.5(a) and 3.6(a) 
Attorney speech pertaining to pending cases is classified as protected.117 
But, the Court has held that an attorney can constitutionally be sanctioned if 
her or his remarks about pending cases will substantially prejudice an 
adjudicatory proceeding.118 Underlying this rationale is the principle that as 
licensed officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to aid in the fair 
administration of justice.119 Based upon this rationale, it is clear that an 
attorney’s speech about proceedings or about a judge in a detrimental 
manner could have a negative impact on the fair administration of justice. 
Courts have held that attorneys’ speech in this context is permissibly chilled 
in some circumstances.120  
This principle is memorialized in Model Rule 3.5(a). 121  Model Rule 
3.5(a) prevents lawyers from communicating with judges, jurors, or 
                                                        
115 See THE FLORIDA BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON ADVERTISING, Guidelines for 
Networking Sites, FLORIDA BAR (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ 
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/18BC39758BB54A5985257B590063EDA8/$FILE/
Guidelines%20-%20Social%20Networking%20Sites.pdf?OpenElement (“Invitations sent 
directly from a social media site via instant messaging to a third party to view or link to 
the lawyer’s page on an unsolicited basis for the purpose of obtaining, or attempting to 
obtain, legal business are solicitations in violation of Rule 4-7.18(a)[.]”). 
116 Id. 
117 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
118 Id. at 1034. 
119 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (overturning a conviction because the 
trial had a “carnival atmosphere” and the jury was exposed to publicity). 
120 See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1569 (indicating that an attorneys’ opinionated 
speech about the judiciary can even be restricted). 
121 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(a) (2013). 
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prospective jurors in a manner that would hinder a court’s impartiality.122 
Additionally, Rule 3.6(a) prohibits attorneys from making statements to the 
press that will likely prejudice trials.123 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of these rules after 
Nevada adopted a similar provision.124 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, an 
attorney argued that the “substantial likelihood” threshold currently in place 
to determine whether an attorney’s speech is protected in regard to 
adjudicatory proceedings was too burdensome and instead should be 
replaced by a “clear and present danger” threshold.125 However, the Court 
disagreed and held that “the substantial likelihood of material prejudice” 
standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First 
Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in 
fair trials.”126 
Rule 3.5(a) extends outside of attorneys’ personal involvement in the 
representation of their clients, which illustrates that attorneys can be 
disciplined outside the scope of their professional actions. For example, in 
2009 the California Bar Disciplinary Commission sanctioned a San Diego 
attorney who had posted information on his personal blog about a trial on 
which he was serving as a juror. 127  In his postings, he included case 
details.128 As a result of these postings, the trial verdict was eventually 
                                                        
122 See id. (“A lawyer shall not: (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or 
other official by means prohibited by law . . .”). 
123 Id. R. 3.6(a) (“A lawyer who is participating or has participated in a matter shall not 
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be 
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter”). 
124 See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1030. 
125 See id. 
126 Id. at 1074. 
127 John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers. 
html. 
128 Id. 
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vacated and the case was remanded to the lower court.129 Because he was an 
attorney himself, the disciplinary committee suspended his license for 45 
days, placed him on a two-year probation period upon reinstatement, and 
ordered him to pay $14,000 in legal fees incurred by the parties in the 
underlying case.130 
4.  Disclosure of Confidential Information—Model Rule 1.6 
The relationship between an attorney and a client is unique. Necessary 
privileges and fiduciary duties have been indoctrinated within the 
profession in order for attorneys to effectively do their jobs. One of the 
bedrock privileges in the profession, which is commonly known—but 
frequently misunderstood—is the attorney-client confidentiality privilege. 
This privilege has been memorialized in Model Rule 1.6, which states that 
an attorney cannot disclose confidential information of a client without that 
client’s informed consent (with limited exceptions).131 If attorneys violate 
this rule, they will face ethical sanctions by their state disciplinary 
commission. Consequently, here too, is another example of a limitation on 
an attorney’s First Amendment rights due to the nature of the profession. 
With the explosion of technology and the internet, Model Rule 1.6 has 
been a hot topic recently. Confidential information is not kept under lock 
and key as in the past with physical files. Law firms have become targets of 
hackers for the valuable information that they keep—bank account 
numbers, social security numbers, corporate trade secrets, etc.132 Beyond 
this, however, attorneys have also unbelievably taken to the internet 
pseudo-anonymously and have disclosed confidential information about 
their clients. 
                                                        
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6 (2013). 
132 Jennifer Smith, Client Secrets at Risk as Hackers Target Law Firms, WALL STREET J. 
(Jun. 25, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/06/25/dont-click-on-that-link-client-
secrets-at-risk-as-hackers-target-law-firms/. 
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For example, from 2007 to 2008, Kristine Peshek, an Illinois assistant 
public defender of 19 years lost her job for disclosing confidential 
information on her blog about some of her clients.133  In one post, Ms. 
Peshek disclosed a client’s jail identification number and stated that he was 
stupid for falling upon his sword for his brother on a controlled substance 
possession charge because “he’s no snitch.”134 In another post, she wrote: 
Dennis, the diabetic whose case I mentioned in Wednesday’s post, 
did drop as ordered, after his court appearance Tuesday and before 
allegedly going to the ER. Guess what? It was positive for cocaine. 
He was standing there in court stoned, right in front of the judge, 
probation officer, prosecutor and defense attorney swearing he was 
clean and claiming ignorance as to why his blood sugar wasn’t 
being managed well.135 
As a result of these statements, the Illinois Attorney Disciplinary 
Commission determined that the attorney’s conduct violated the ethical 
rules of conduct as it was both prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. She was 
suspended for sixty days.136 
5.  Admission to a State Bar Association—The Case of Matthew F. Hale 
In 1998, the Illinois State Bar Commission on Character and Fitness was 
presented with an unusual situation. 137  Matthew Hale, a freshly minted 
graduate from the University of Southern Illinois Law School passed the 
Illinois bar examination.138 It was now the Commission’s job to analyze 
                                                        
133 In re Peshnek, M.R. 23794, 09 CH 89 (Ill. 2010). 
134 In re Kristine Ann Peshek, Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and 
Disciplinary Commission (Aug. 25, 2009), https:www.iardc.org/09CH0089CM.html. 
135 Id. 
136 In re Peshnek, M.R. 23794, 09 CH 89 (Ill. 2010). 
137 Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racist at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and 
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 25, 25–26 (2006), 
available at http://www3.law.harvard.edu/journals/hjrej-articles/archive/vol22/billy.pdf. 
138 Id. 
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whether this individual possessed the moral integrity to be admitted in 
Illinois to practice law. 
While this is usually a routine decision the Commission faces, 
occasionally it will come across individuals with violent felonies or a 
pattern of dishonesty. Matthew Hale’s application was unique. He was an 
outspoken leader of the Klu Klux Klan. 139  But, Hale informed the 
Commission that he would follow laws in existence mandating equality. 
Nevertheless, the Inquiry Panel for the Committee on Character and Fitness 
was left with a tough question—whether in spite of his racist beliefs, Hale 
possessed the “requisite character and fitness” to be admitted to the Illinois 
Bar. 
In a two to one decision, the Inquiry panel denied Hale admission to the 
Illinois Bar as a result of his racist beliefs.140 However, the Inquiry Panel 
did not make this decision lightly. It recognized that denying Hale 
admission to the Bar based upon his hate speech and his association with a 
fringe political group may raise First Amendment questions. The Inquiry 
Panel reasoned that when balancing Hale’s interest with the State’s, their 
decision would be upheld under existing First Amendment analysis 
scrutiny.141 Principally, the Panel concluded that lawyers are dedicated to 
preserving certain “fundamental truths,” and one such truth is racial 
equality.142 As Matthew Hale’s outspoken beliefs were in sharp opposition 
to this fundamental truth, the Panel determined that it would be 
constitutional to reject his admission to the Bar to protect the State’s 
interests in preserving the integrity of the bar and the laws of the State.143 
                                                        
139 Id. 
140 In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (1st Dis. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ET. AL, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 875 (3d ed. 
1999). 
141 See Billy, supra note 137, at 31. 
142 Id. 
143 Wendel, supra note 49, at 316–17. 
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Interestingly, groups in direct contrast to Hale’s ideology disagreed with 
this decision.144 Notably, a large Jewish civil rights organization, the Anti-
Defamation League, disagreed with Hale’s denial. One regional Director of 
the organization stated, “[w]e are repulsed by Matt Hale, but we respect the 
principle of speech and believe he is entitled to the opportunity to spew his 
venom without restriction.” 145  The concern with this decision was that 
perhaps the tables would turn one day, and that radical minority groups 
would be prohibited under the same rationale. 146  However, the Inquiry 
Panel’s decision aligns with prior Supreme Court decisions where it has 
upheld a states’ denials of bar membership as a result of the individuals’ 
affiliation with groups with ideologies that run afoul of existing 
constitutional tenets.147 
The Matthew Hale example draws an interesting parallel with a proposal 
prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct that is considered to be 
discrimination or sexually biased harassment. Throughout the profession’s 
history, good moral character has been considered a requirement for the 
practice of law. 148  The Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar of 
California essentially held that state bar associations indeed could impose a 
requirement of good moral character in evaluating whether applicants could 
be admitted to the bar.149 
If state bar associations can initially impose a requirement of good moral 
character when considering whether individuals should be admitted to 
practice in their respective jurisdictions, should they be able to discipline 
attorneys who fall below this standard? The most comparable model rule to 
                                                        
144 See Billy, supra note 137, at 31. 
145 Id. 
146 See, e.g., Adrienne Drell, Jewish Group Protests Denial of Law License for Anti-
Semite, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 14; Elli Wohlgelernter, Spreading Hate on the 
Net, JERUSALEM POST, Jul. 9, 1999, at 6B. 
147 See generally Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). 
148 See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 
491, 493 (1985). 
149 See Billy, supra note 137, at 28. 
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the requirement of possessing good moral character is Model Rule 8.4, 
which was enacted to maintain the integrity of the profession.150 Model 
Rule 8.4 defines attorney misconduct.151 However, Model Rule 8.4 is not 
promulgated to regulate all types of behavior by attorneys; instead, it limits 
itself to defining what is considered “professional misconduct.” 152  
Generally, when attorneys engage in misogynistic and racist speech on the 
internet, they are exhibiting this behavior on their free time. Therefore, this 
Model Rule would not apply because attorneys are engaging in conduct that 
is outside the scope of their professional duties. 
VI.  THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SHOULD MODIFY MODEL RULE 8.4 
In order to reign in attorneys’ hate speech, the ABA should modify its 
Model Rule 8.4 to explicitly state that attorneys are prohibited from 
engaging in or manifesting intentional discriminatory comments to harass. 
While this measure may seem drastic, and at odds with the First 
Amendment, the model rule will be beneficial towards maintaining the 
public’s general perception that the legal profession is indoctrinated with 
the notion of civility. Furthermore, other similar efforts have been made in 
prohibiting discriminatory conduct by lawyers.153 
Such a model rule, if adopted by state bar associations, likely would be 
constitutional despite the First Amendment due to the compelling interest of 
the profession to protect its image.154 In the case of Matthew Hale, the 
Inquiry Panel analyzed that scenario under the lens of free-speech 
                                                        
150 See MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4 (2013). The subtitle of Model Rule 8.4 is 
“Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession.” 
151 Id. 
152 See id. 
153 E.g., Andrew Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the 
First Amendment is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal 
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 783 (1996). 
154 See In re Rouss, 116 N.E. at 783 (stating the practice of law is a privilege which in 
turn comes with additional burdens). 
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limitations in the context of government-run work places.155 Consequently, 
when analyzing whether a limitation on speech is constitutional, the 
government’s interest “must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the 
burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest.”156 
However, Pickering v. Board of Education demonstrates that an 
individual’s fundamental right of free speech must still be weighed with a 
state’s compelling interests. 157  Applying this analysis to the proposed 
change to Model Rule 8.4, state bar associations have a compelling interest 
in maintaining the public’s perception of the integrity of the profession in 
order to facilitate a system with the purpose of administering justice 
neutrally. 
Comments and statements made online by an individual in a profession 
may damage the integrity of her or his professional group affiliation. For 
example, Amanda Tatro, a mortuary-science student, posted updates on her 
social network page about her cadaver, which she had named “Bernie.”158 
In one such posting, Tatro stated she was, “looking forward to Monday’s 
embalming therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me 
room, lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar.” 159  Eventually, 
Tatro’s University became aware of these postings and her administrators 
disciplined her by requiring her to take a clinical ethics class, requiring her 
to undertake a psychiatric evaluation, and placing her on academic 
probation. 160  Tatro challenged her university’s discipline on First 
Amendment grounds.161 The court, however, disagreed because Tatro had 
                                                        
155 See Billy, supra note 137, at 30. 
156 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
157 Pickering v. Bd. Of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). 
158 ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 84 (citing Tatro v. U. of Minnesota, 2011 WL 2672220 
(Minn. App. 2011)). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech 95 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
undermined the public’s perception of a profession that is dependent upon 
its trust.162 
The Tatro case illustrates that courts can find that a professional 
institution can restrict speech to maintain the public perception of the 
profession—this falls within the category of a compelling interest. It is well 
recognized that attorneys have a unique role in society and have the burden 
of higher professional ethical standards.163 This burden simply comes with 
the privilege of being an officer of the courts. This is an understanding 
individuals appreciate at the time they apply for admission to the bar, and 
when they are sworn in under oath before their respective state supreme 
courts to practice law. 
A.  History of the Prior Proposal 
In 1992, a report commissioned by the ABA in regard to whether there 
was evidence of racial and ethnic bias in the justice system concluded such 
bias does exist within the system.164 The report recommended that 
[n]o lawyer should intentionally engage in racially or ethnically 
discriminatory acts in the practice of his or her profession. The 
Task Force recommends that the ABA consider amending its 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to make acts of racial and 
ethnic discrimination while acting in one’s professional capacity 
sanctionable and unprofessional conduct.165 
After this report was issued at the 1994 midyear ABA meeting, a 
recommendation was offered to modify Model Rule 8.4 to prohibit 
attorneys’ discriminatory conduct by considering it as professional 
                                                        
162 Id. 
163 See In re Rouss, 116 N.E. at 783 (stating that the practice of law is a privilege which in 
turn comes with additional burdens); see generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
(2013). 
164 See TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN 
A DIVERSE AMERICA, ABA (1992). 
165 Id. 
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misconduct under the Rule.166 Eventually the ABA Standing Committee 
determined that it would be a mistake to incorporate such a broad, sweeping 
prohibition in the Model Rules. 167  The Committee’s reasoning for this 
determination rested on the constitutionality of prohibiting such speech due 
to First Amendment protections. 168  The Committee believed that “a 
disciplinary rule to control lawyer speech would undoubtedly run afoul of 
the First Amendment.”169  The next section of this Article explains why 
revisitation of this issue is due. 
B.  Revisitation of this Issue Is Due 
A new rule prohibiting attorneys from engaging in discriminatory and 
misogynistic speech should be adopted. The proliferation of hate speech and 
sexist remarks online is a growing and serious issue. Attorneys engage in 
this conduct, which has sullied the professional image. The ramifications of 
this type of speech published online for the whole world to view are real 
and serious—people are injured, reputations are tarnished, and damages 
occur.170 
The best way of curtailing this behavior by attorneys is by defining it as 
an act of professional misconduct pursuant to Model Rule 8.4. If this is 
done, and states will subsequently adopt the suggested model rule, and 
attorneys will likely be deterred from engaging in this conduct online. 
Currently, the reach of the ABA’s Model Rule 8.4 is very narrow in regard 
to what is considered professional “misconduct.” Of note, however, the rule 
does not limit itself to attorneys’ conduct wholly within the scope of their 
professional duties. Professional misconduct for attorneys includes 
                                                        
166 David Isbell, MATERIALS RELATING TO LAWYERS’ DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1995). 
167 Taslitz, supra note 153, at 784–85. 
168 Id. 
169 ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE ABA 
TAKES A STAND AGAINST MANIFESTATIONS OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE: A 
RECOMMENDATION FOR A POLICY RATHER THAN A DISCIPLINARY RULE, ABA 3 (1994). 
170 See supra, notes 9, 22, 86, & 130. 
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behaving in a dishonest manner and engaging in any conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.171 
The intent of Model Rule 8.4 is depicted in its comments. The Model 
Rule is drafted in order to discipline attorneys who engage in conduct that 
reflects adversely on their fitness to practice law.172 Comment 3 of Model 
Rule 8.4 considers it professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in 
conduct that evidences a bias or prejudice based upon an individual’s “race, 
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status.”173 However, Model Rule 8.4 is only applicable to an 
attorney’s conduct within their professional scope. When the previously 
modified model rule was suggested in the 1994 mid-year meeting, the 
Committee was operating under a false presumption that it would be unable 
to constitutionally draft such a rule.174 This is untrue. Attorneys can have 
their First Amendment rights limited in some circumstances as admission to 
practice is a privilege—those who want to exercise their full First 
Amendment rights may give up the privilege of practicing law. 
This is evidenced by the present constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4 (the 
prohibition of adverse remarks about the judiciary) despite the Rule’s clear 
content and view-point discrimination. 175  Moreover, the Hale scenario 
raises an interesting parallel with the issues presented here—discriminatory 
remarks as a basis for discipline. 
Similar to the Illinois Inquiry Panel’s reasoning, state bar disciplinary 
commissions should be able to discipline individuals who make racist and 
sexist comments. State bar associations and their respective state supreme 
                                                        
171 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)–(d) (2013). 
172 See generally id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 1–4 (2013) (“Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect 
adversely on fitness to practice law”; “A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an 
inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers”). 
173 Id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2013). 
174 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 169. 
175 Day, supra note 92, at 183–84. 
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courts have a compelling interest in maintaining the public image of a 
profession that is linked with integrity and upholding the law.176 Public 
racist and sexist remarks run directly contrary to this effort—and should be 
prohibited similarly to negative remarks made about the judiciary. Akin to 
Model Rule 8.4’s prohibition of negative comments pertaining to the 
judiciary, a prohibition on public discriminatory and misogynistic 
comments made by attorneys could be upheld as constitutional if analyzed 
under the First Amendment. 
C.  A New Proposal for Modification 
In determining what the new proposed language of Model Rule 8.4 
should be, there are other templates. For example, in 1996, Andrew Taslitz 
and Sharon Styles-Anderson proposed a modification of ABA Model Rule 
8.4.177 They supported this proposal by arguing for an amendment drafted 
narrowly to restrict attorney speech that is discriminatory with the intent to 
intimidate while acting as a legal professional. 178  This is a good start; 
however, it is too conservative of a rule in the modern context, considering 
the realities the modern world faces as a result of the global proliferation of 
daily internet use. 
 Instead, the ABA should adopt a broad rule that considers an attorney’s 
discriminatory direct harassment of all individuals misconduct under Model 
Rule 8.4. One option is drafting a new sub-category for Model Rule 8.4. 
This new sub-category would be added to Model Rule 8.4 in defining what 
is considered professional misconduct. This sub-category, (g), would state, 
“Engage in speech that is discriminatory based upon race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.” 
                                                        
176 See generally, In re Rouss, 116 N.E. at 783 (stating that the practice of law is a 
privilege which in turn comes with additional burdens). 
177 See generally, Taslitz, supra note 153. 
178 Id. 
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If incorporating a whole new subcategory is not considered the best 
option, the existing Model Rule 8.4 Comment 2 can be edited to broadly 
prohibit this conduct.179 This is a simpler alternative, as all that must be 
done is eliminate the present language, which prohibits this conduct only 
when it is “in the course of representing a client[.]” 
In the last proposed alternative, if the ABA does not wish to directly 
address racist and sexist comments by prohibiting the conduct in the Model 
Rule, it can instead adopt language that more broadly encompasses all 
conduct that may raise an issue of whether an individual is fit to practice 
law. For example, New York has adopted a rule that prohibits attorneys 
from “conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”180 
This is a rather discretionary rule and casts a wide net of all misconduct, 
and it would be reasonable for a state bar disciplinary commission to 
determine that an attorney who repeatedly harasses another individual 
online to be unfit to practice law.181 This last alternative is the best option 
for the ABA and is what should be adopted. 
                                                        
179 MODEL RULES, supra note 171, at R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (“Many kinds of illegal conduct 
reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the 
offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses 
carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses 
involving ‘moral turpitude.’ That concept can be construed to include offenses 
concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, 
that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is 
personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally 
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law 
practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference 
with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, 
even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to 
legal obligation.”). 
180 NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4, cmt. 3 (2013). 
181 Milan Markovic, Law Professor Files Ethics Complaint Against Scamblogger, LEGAL 
ETHICS FORUM (December 28, 2013), available at http://www.legalethicsforum.com/ 
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D.  Model Rule 8.4 Should Be Broadened 
Simply, the broad formulation of Model Rule 8.4 that defines misconduct 
as any conduct that is dishonest or prejudicial to the administration of 
justice is the most constitutional solution for addressing the problem of 
attorneys participating in hate speech. While the latter proposals are likely 
constitutional due to the compelling interest of maintaining the public 
image of the bar, to be safe, the ABA can circumvent the issue of drafting a 
rule that can run afoul of the First Amendment by indirectly attacking this 
conduct. Constructing a broad Rule 8.4 with language akin to New York’s 
promulgated version will prevent a challenge of its constitutionality in this 
circumstance, as a result of it being a content-based restriction similar to 
R.A.V.182 An express prohibition of discriminatory remarks is analogous to 
the legislation at issue in R.A.V., which only protected minority groups.183 
Therefore, such a prohibition may be considered viewpoint discrimination 
in First Amendment analysis. 
By adopting language similar to New York’s, Model Rule 8.4, the ABA 
will circumvent this analysis. Furthermore, it will provide state disciplinary 
commissions more ammunition in their arsenal for disciplining attorneys 
whose conduct does not fall within the provinces of the concrete rules in 
place. Undoubtedly, there is a myriad of activities that should constitute 
misconduct and that reflect adversely on an attorney’s ability to practice 
law, but do not fit neatly within the rules. If disciplinary commissions were 
provided with a discretionary rule such as the one proposed, they will be 
better able to regulate attorneys admitted in their state bar. 
If a narrow rule governing attorney speech were constructed only to 
prevent misogynistic or racist remarks, it would not govern other speech 
made by attorneys that is inherently harmful. For example, if an attorney 
decides to develop and operate a revenge porn website for personal profit, 
                                                        
182 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392–94. 
183 Id. 
Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech 101 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
the public will undoubtedly perceive such operation of a website negatively 
and impute this negativity to the profession. Presently, running a website 
like this is protected under the First Amendment, and the narrow rule 
governing lawyers’ speech would not apply. Arguably, this type of behavior 
negatively reflects on the character of the attorney and the attorney should 
likely be disciplined for this misconduct. However, there is nothing 
presently in the Model Rules that would enable a state bar to discipline this 
individual. For this reason, a Model Rule 8.4 that broadly prohibits any 
conduct that reflects negatively on an attorney’s character should be 
adopted. 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of our land, 
ensures equal protection of all citizens regardless of their national origin, 
creed, or race. Lawyers, as administrators of justice and officers of the 
court, are instrumental in ensuring that US citizens’ rights are protected. 
The goal of this nation is to ultimately become color-blind. Eventually US 
citizens should not notice what skin color their neighbors possess. It should 
simply be of no concern for them—just as the sky is blue or the grass is 
green. Licensed attorneys who engage in hate speech undermine and 
conflict with what the profession and the Constitution stand for. Therefore, 
the ABA should adopt a Model Rule that would enable disciplinary 
commissions to reprimand attorneys who engage in this conduct. Otherwise, 
attorney commenters like Dybukk will continue to run amok on the internet 
on websites such as AutoAdmit, and will make discriminatory and 
misogynistic comments without any formal reprimand. 
 
